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GOVERNANCE IN GLOBAL 
VALUE CHAINS 
 
The concept of 'governance' is central to the 
global value chain approach. This article 
explains what it means and  why it matters 
for development research and policy. The 
concept is used to refer to the inter-firm 
relationships and institutional mechanisms 
through which non-market co-ordination of 
activities in the chain takes place. This co-
ordination is achieved through the setting 
and enforcement of product and process 
parameters to be met by actors in the chain. 
In global value chains in which developing 
country producers typically operate, buyers 
play an important role in setting and enforc-
ing these parameters. They set these pa-
rameters because of the (perceived) risk of 
producer failure. Product and process 
parameters are also set by government 
agencies and international organisations 
concerned with quality standards or labour 
and environmental standards. To the extent 
that external parameter setting and en-
forcement develop and gain credibility, the 
need for governance by buyers within the 
chain will decline. 
 
1. Introduction * 
If trade liberalisation is to bring benefits 
to developing countries, then these 
countries must be able to export products 
for which they have a comparative ad-
vantage in developed-country markets. 
Analysis of trade in labour-intensive 
products such as clothes, shoes and high-
value, fresh vegetables has highlighted 
important features of the way in which 
this trade is organised. Increasingly, 
trade in these products is organised by 
global buyers, who may work for, or act 
                                                 
* The authors are grateful to Raphael Kap-
linsky for helpful comments on an earlier 
draft. 
on behalf of, major retailers or brand-
name companies. This has been shown 
to be the case in, for example, the trade 
of garments between East Asian coun-
tries and the US (Gereffi 1999), the trade 
in horticultural products between Africa 
and the UK (Dolan and Humphrey 2000) 
and the trade in footwear from China and 
Brazil to the US and Europe (Schmitz 
and Knorringa 2000). One of the key 
findings of these and other studies is that 
access to developed-country markets has 
become increasingly dependent on enter-
ing into the global production networks 
of lead firms situated in developed coun-
tries. The fact that these lead firms are 
just as likely to be retailers or brand-
name companies (Tesco, Marks & 
Spencer, Gap, Nike) as manufacturers is 
one of the key insights of global value-
chain research.  
This leads to a more general insight. 
It has long been recognised that in situa-
tions characterised by bounded rational-
ity in which information is either un-
available or can only be acquired at a 
cost, organisations as well as markets 
coordinate economic activities. Organi-
sations emerge because markets: 
“depend on a shared knowledge of the 
prices and the characteristics of the goods 
that are being traded, the absence of serious 
third-person effects (so-called 'externalities') 
that are not reflected in prices, and suffi-
cient stability of products and manufactur-
ing practices so that both sellers and buyers 
can plan their activities rationally and make 
rational decisions to sell and buy at the 
prices at which the markets equilibrate.” 
(Simon 2000: 750) 
A significant amount of trade in the 
global economy (although it is difficult 
to quantify how much) is carried out in 
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the form of transactions between sub-
sidiaries of transnational companies. It is 
less widely recognised that trade is also 
organised through networks of legally 
independent firms using a variety of 
transactional relationships. Thirty years 
ago, Richardson (1972: 883) referred to 
this as ‘the dense network of co-
operation and affiliation by which firms 
are inter-related’. Recent research sug-
gests that such relationships can increas-
ingly be found in international trade. 
Global value-chain research in particular 
seeks to understand the nature of these 
relationships and their implications for 
development. 
The concept of ‘governance’ is cen-
tral to the global value-chain approach. 
We use the term to express that some 
firms in the chain set and/or enforce the 
parameters under which others in the 
chain operate. A chain without govern-
ance would just be a string of market 
relations. Instances of governance are 
easy to describe. The celebrated UK 
television programme about Tesco's role 
in controlling the production of 
mangetout in Zimbabwe would be a 
clear example of governance in a global 
value chain. In this case, Tesco was 
clearly calling the shots, even though it 
did not own the farms or the packing 
facilities. In fact, Tesco only takes own-
ership of the product when it arrives at 
the regional distribution centres in the 
UK. But this does not prevent Tesco 
influencing what happens at earlier 
points in the chain.  
Governance can be exercised in dif-
ferent ways, and different parts of the 
same chain can be governed in different 
ways. In a previous paper (Humphrey 
and Schmitz 2000) we explored why 
these differences matter for the upgrad-
ing prospects of producers in developing 
countries. This article seeks to deepen 
our understanding of governance. Sec-
tion 2 brings together the main reasons 
why a concern with chain governance 
matters for development research and 
policy. Section 3 examines what pre-
cisely chain governance is. Section 4 
asks why chain governance is needed 
and why it is a salient feature in trade 
with developing countries. Section 5 sets 
out how compliance with product and 
process parameters can be ensured. The 
final Section 6 maps out briefly the 
likely future trends in chain governance. 
2. Why Does Governance 
Matter? 
The issue of governance in value chains 
is important for the following reasons: 
• Market access. Even when devel-
oped countries dismantle trade barri-
ers, developing-country producers do 
not automatically gain market access, 
because the chains that producers 
feed into are often governed by a 
limited number of buyers. In order to 
participate in export manufacturing 
for North America and Western 
Europe, developing-country produc-
ers need access to the lead firms of 
these chains. These lead firms ‘un-
dertake the functional integration and 
coordination of internationally dis-
persed activities’ (Gereffi 1999: 41). 
Decisions by the chains’ lead firms 
may cause particular types of pro-
ducers and traders to lose out. For 
example, recent research on the UK-
Africa horticulture chain suggests 
that small growers are marginalised. 
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The reason, it seems, does not lie in 
the efficiency advantage of large 
growers but in the lead firms’ sourc-
ing strategies, which are influenced 
by the expectations of consumers, 
NGOs and government agencies with 
regard to safety and environmental 
and labour standards (Dolan and 
Humphrey 2000; 165-69).  
• Fast track to acquisition of produc-
tion capabilities. Those producers 
that gain access to the chains’ lead 
firms tend to find themselves on a 
steep learning curve. The lead firms 
are very demanding with regard to 
reducing cost, raising quality and in-
creasing speed (and are therefore un-
popular with the local workforce). 
But they also transmit best practices 
and provide hands-on advice (and 
pressure!) on how to improve layout, 
production flows and raise skills. It is 
this combination of high challenge 
and high support that is often found 
in the highly governed chains and 
that explains how relatively under-
developed regions become major ex-
port producers in a short period of 
time. The Brazilian shoe industry in 
the early 1970s and the Vietnamese 
garment industry in the late 1990s 
are good examples. There is now bo-
rad agreement in the literature that 
this upgrading effect is particularly 
significant for local producers new to 
the global market (Gereffi 1999; 
Keesing and Lall 1992; Piore and 
Ruiz Durán 1998). However, there is 
also recognition that the governance 
structures which facilitate the fast 
acquisition of production capabilities 
can create barriers for the acquisition 
of design and marketing capabilities 
(Schmitz and Knorringa 2000). 
• Distribution of gains. Understanding 
the governance of a chain helps to 
understand the distribution of gains 
along the chain. Kaplinsky (2000), in 
particular, suggests that the ability to 
govern often rests in intangible com-
petences (R&D, design, branding, 
marketing) which are characterised 
by high barriers of entry and com-
mand high returns – usually reaped 
by developed-country firms. In con-
trast, developing-country firms tend 
to be locked into the tangible (pro-
duction) activities, producing to the 
parameters set by the ‘governors’, 
suffering from low barriers of entry 
and reaping low returns. While in 
need of systematic empirical verifi-
cation, these governance related dis-
tribution issues are critical to the de-
bate on whether there is a spreading 
of the gains from globalisation. 
• Leverage points for policy initiatives 
Precisely because many global value 
chains are not just strings of market-
based relationships, they can both 
undermine government policy but 
also offer new leverage points for 
government initiatives. The fact that 
some chains are governed by lead 
firms from developed countries pro-
vides leverage for influencing what 
happens in supplier firms in develop-
ing countries. This leverage point has 
been recognised by government and 
non-governmental agencies con-
cerned with raising labour and envi-
ronmental standards. Global chain 
governance, for example, provides 
the basis of the UK government’s 
ethical trade initiative. It would not 
make sense to hold UK companies 
responsible for labour and environ-
mental conditions at developing-
country suppliers if these companies 
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did not know who these suppliers 
were and have influence over these 
conditions. In fact, it makes sense to 
refer to some firms as ‘suppliers of 
x’ and hold x responsible precisely 
because x will have worked with the 
supplier, discussing product design, 
manufacturing (or growing) proc-
esses, and quality systems, and can 
exercise pressure to change them.  
• Funnel for technical assistance. 
Multilateral and bilateral donor 
agencies have for decades sought to 
find ways of providing effective 
technical assistance to developing-
country producers. Progress was at 
best modest. Recently these agencies 
have embarked on experiments of 
fostering TNC-SME partnership. The 
central idea is to combine technical 
assistance with connectivity. The 
lead firms of chains become the en-
try point for reaching out to a multi-
tude of distant small and medium 
sized suppliers. It is recognised, 
however, that some buyers may re-
quire ‘mentoring’ in order to fulfil 
this funnel and transmission func-
tion. The UN (through the Global 
Compact), the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), the United Nations In-
dustrial Development Organisation 
(UNIDO), the German Cooperation 
Agency (GTZ), the UK Department 
for International Development 
(DFID), and the Prince of Wales 
Fund are experimenting with this ap-
proach,1 but more areas of applica-
tion need to be explored. For exam-
                                                 
1 See, for example, UNCTAD (2000), 
UNIDO (2000), and the following websites: 
www.unglobalcompact.org; 
www.dfid.gov.uk; www.gtz.de/ppp.  
ple, an analysis of horticultural value 
chains highlights the critical role 
played by UK supermarkets and im-
porters in this trade and points to the 
importance of targeting these buyers 
when considering initiatives to pro-
mote smallholder production of ex-
port horticulture crops.  
3. What is Chain  
Governance? 
It is quite easy to point to instances of 
governance in inter-firm relationships 
within global value chains. One clear 
example would be the way in which 
leading UK supermarkets exercise con-
trol over their fresh-vegetable supply 
chains.2 Not only do they specify the 
type of products they wish to buy (in-
cluding varieties, processing and packag-
ing), but also processes such as the 
quality systems that need to be in place. 
These requirements are enforced through 
a system of auditing and inspection and, 
ultimately, through the decision to keep 
or discard a supplier. Clearly, govern-
ance in value chains has something to do 
with the exercise of control along the 
chain. 
At any point in the chain, the pro-
duction process (in its widest sense, 
including quality, logistics design, etc.) 
is defined by a set of parameters. The 
four key parameters that define what is 
to be done are: 
1. What is to be produced. We refer to 
this as product definition.3  
                                                 
2 These issues are discussed in Dolan and 
Humphrey (2000). 
3 This term is taken from Sturgeon (2000). 
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2. How it is to be produced. This 
involves the definition of production 
processes, which can include ele-
ments such as the technology to be 
used, quality systems, labour stan-
dards and environmental standards. 
3. When it is to be produced.  
4. How much is to be produced. 
To these four basic parameters one 
might add a fifth parameter, price. Al-
though prices are usually treated as a 
variable determined in the market, it is 
frequently the case that major customers 
(particularly those competing more on 
price than, for example, product quality) 
insist that their suppliers design products 
and processes in order to meet a particu-
lar target price. 
The question of governance arises 
when some firms in the chain work 
according to parameters set by others. 
When this happens, governance struc-
tures may be required to transmit infor-
mation about parameters and enforce 
compliance. In short, governance refers 
to the inter-firm relationships and institu-
tional mechanisms through which non-
market coordination of activities in the 
chain is achieved.  
Governance, in the sense of ar-
rangements that make possible the non-
market coordination of activities,4 is not 
a necessary feature of value chains. 
                                                 
4 By restricting the term ‘governance’ to non-
market coordination of economic activities, 
we are distinguishing between ‘market co-
ordination’ and ‘coordination through gov-
ernance mechanisms’. In this respect, we do 
not follow the practice of Williamson 
(1979: 247) who sees governance struc-
tures, including market governance, as 
characteristic of all transaction arrange-
ments. 
Many goods are traded in markets 
through a series of arm's-length market 
relationships between firms. The pa-
rameters are defined solely by each firm 
at its point in the chain. So, for example, 
a firm might make a product according 
to its own estimations of market demand 
(‘make to forecast’), using a design that 
has no reference to any particular cus-
tomer (i.e. either a completely standard 
product, or a product developed in-
house) and using its own processes. The 
buyer then encounters a ready-made and 
ready-to-buy product. There are various 
ways in which inter-firm relationships 
can differ from this pattern. For exam-
ple, the decisions about ‘when’ and ‘how 
much’ will be made jointly by the pro-
ducer and the buyer when production is 
scheduled according to ‘make-to-order’ 
rather than ‘make-to-forecast’. This is 
typical when products have many possi-
ble variants, which renders make-to-
forecast uneconomic. 
From the point of view of the analy-
sis of inter-firm linkages in the global 
economy, the critical parameters for 
value-chain governance are the first two: 
what is to be produced, and how it is to 
be produced. These parameters are often 
set by buyers.5 In each case, the level of 
detail at which the parameters are speci-
fied can vary. In the case of product 
definition, the buyer can provide differ-
                                                 
5 In many cases, parameter setting goes 
‘backwards’ along the chain, from buyer to 
seller, but this is by no means always the 
case. Buyer and seller may set parameters 
jointly if they each have competences rele-
vant to the parameters being set. In a few 
cases, parameter setting goes ‘forwards’ 
from seller to buyer - franchise operations 
are the clearest example of this. 
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ent levels of specification. It can set a 
design problem for the producer, which 
the producer then solves by providing its 
technology and design. The buyer might 
provide a particular design for the pro-
ducer to work on, or the buyer might 
even provide detailed drawings for the 
producer. Buyers can also specify proc-
ess parameters. This has been most 
evident through buyer involvement in 
their suppliers' quality systems, but it is 
also increasingly evident in specification 
of process parameters in relation to 
labour and environmental standards. 
Once again, these can be specified at 
different levels of detail. In some cases, 
the buyer may merely refer to the proc-
ess standards to be attained. In other 
cases, the buyer will specify precisely 
how particular standards should be 
attained by requiring and perhaps help-
ing to introduce particular production 
processes, monitoring procedures, etc. 
When the buyer plays this role, we refer 
to it as the ‘lead firm’ in the chain.  
The fact that this lead role can be 
played by a variety of firms leads to 
Gereffi's distinction between producer-
driven and buyer-driven global value 
chains (Gereffi 1994). In producer-
driven chains, the key parameters are set 
by firms that control key product and 
process technologies, for example in the 
car industry. In buyer-driven chains, the 
key parameters are set by retailers and 
brand-name firms which focus on design 
and marketing, not necessarily possess-
ing any production facilities. 
Product and process parameters can 
also be set by agents external to the 
chain, as has been argued by Kaplinsky 
(2000: 125). Government agencies and 
international organisations regulate 
product design and manufacture, not 
only with a view to consumer safety, but 
also in order to create transparent mar-
kets (for example, by defining standard 
weights and sizes or technical norms). 
Examples of such parameter-setting by 
agents external to the chain include 
food-safety standards, norms with regard 
to the safety of products such as chil-
dren's toys, electrical equipment and 
motor vehicles and control of hazardous 
substances in a wide range of products. 
Once again, these norms can refer to the 
product (are its physical characteristics 
and design in conformance with re-
quirements?) or to the process (is it 
being produced in ways which conform 
to particular standards?). In some cases, 
process norms are pursued as a means to 
achieving product standards (for exam-
ple, hygienic food preparation systems 
are designed to produced safe food) and 
in others because of the intrinsic value of 
particular types of processes (for exam-
ple, animal welfare requirements). Gov-
ernments may set standards which are 
compulsory and have legal force. Stan-
dards may also be set by non-legal 
agreements (code of conduct, etc.) and 
by a variety of unofficial agencies, such 
as NGOs, which pressure for compliance 
with labour and environmental stan-
dards.6  
Parameters set from outside the 
chain lead to chain governance when one 
agent in the chain either enforces the 
                                                 
6 The issue of governance through product 
and process standards has become increas-
ingly complex, partly due to the prolifera-
tion of such standards. For an overview, see 
Nadvi and Waeltring (2001).  
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compliance with parameters of other 
agents or translates the parameter into a 
set of requirements which it then moni-
tors and/or enforces. This situation 
usually arises when agents at one point 
in the chain might be held responsible 
for actions by agents (or the conse-
quences of these actions) at other points 
in the chain. The UK Food Safety Act, 
for example, places upon food retailers a 
requirement for ‘due diligence’ with 
respect to the manufacture, transport, 
storage and preparation of food. The 
retailers can be held liable for not serv-
ing food fit for consumption. UK super-
markets have developed systems of 
traceability and monitoring to meet the 
due diligence requirement. Similarly, the 
basis of the campaign against Nike in the 
USA was the fact that the company is 
held responsible for labour conditions in 
the factories of its suppliers.  
4. Why is Chain  
Governance Needed? 
If governance in value chains is about 
setting and/or enforcing parameters 
along the chain, the question arises of 
why companies would want to do this. 
Governance by the buyer is costly, 
requiring asset-specific investments in 
relationships with particular suppliers. 
Such investment also increases the 
rigidity of supply chains by raising the 
costs of switching suppliers. Neverthe-
less, many instances of parameter setting 
and enforcement along the chain are 
evident.  
Buyer specification of product de-
sign is most likely to arise when the 
buyer has a better understanding of the 
demands of the market than the supplier. 
The buyer then interprets the needs of 
the market and informs the supplier of 
what is required. As was noted above, 
this information may range from a 
statement of the ‘design problem’ to be 
met to detailed specifications of what is 
to be produced. The supplier's limited 
knowledge of market demands may arise 
in fast-moving markets characterised by 
innovation and product differentiation. 
This can be seen in fashion segments of 
the garments industry, for example. It is 
also likely to arise when developing-
country suppliers are integrated into 
global value chains and exposed to the 
demands of more sophisticated markets. 
As Hobday has argued, the ‘latecomer’ 
firm to the global economy is ‘dislocated 
from the mainstream international mar-
kets it wishes to supply’ (1995:34). 
Suppliers may be confronted with mar-
kets that have different quality require-
ments and also different and hard-to-
interpret safety standards. In this situa-
tion, the buyer may even have to supply 
basic information about product design. 
The main reason for specification of 
process parameters along the chain is 
risk. Buyers specify and enforce parame-
ters when there are potential losses 
arising from a failure to meet commit-
ments (for example, delivering the right 
product on time) or a failure to ensure 
that the product conforms to the neces-
sary standards. These performance risks, 
relating to factors such as quality, re-
sponse time and reliability of delivery, 
become more important as firms engage 
in non-price competition. For example, 
UK supermarkets place great emphasis 
on continuity and consistency of supply. 
The conformance risks spring mainly 
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from increasing concerns about product 
safety, labour standards and environ-
mental standards. These mean that buy-
ers (both retailers and manufacturers) in 
developed countries are exposed to the 
risks of loss of reputation if shortcom-
ings are found at their suppliers. Once 
again, these risks may be a particular 
characteristic of global value chains 
integrating developing-country produc-
ers with developed country buyers. 
Keesing and Lall (1992) argue that 
producers in developing countries are 
expected to meet requirements that 
frequently do not (yet) apply to their 
domestic markets. This creates a gap 
between the capabilities required for the 
domestic market and those required for 
the export market. Therefore, parameter 
setting and enforcement may be required 
to ensure that products and processes 
meet the required standards. If the gap 
has to be closed quickly, buyers will 
need to invest in a few selected suppliers 
and help them to upgrade.  
The corollary of this is that the need 
for parameter setting along the chain 
may decrease as the capabilities of de-
veloping-country suppliers improve and 
diffuse. At the initial stages of a supply 
relationship, buyers may feel the need to 
provide detailed instructions and under-
take close monitoring of supplier per-
formance. As the suppliers become more 
experienced, and as they are able to 
demonstrate their reliability to the cus-
tomer, the latter may begin to indicate 
the standards to be met, but leave it to 
the supplier to work out how to meet 
them.7 An important corollary of this 
                                                 
7 The analysis by Lee and Chen (2000) of the 
acquisition of competences by Taiwanese 
point is that the extent to which product 
and process parameters are set by the 
buyer does not depend upon the intrinsic 
characteristics of the product, such as its 
complexity or its closeness to the tech-
nology frontier, but rather derives from 
the risks faced by the buyer. These arise 
from the level of probability of poor 
performance and the consequences of 
that poor performance.  
5. How Can Firms Ensure 
that Parameters are Met? 
Once parameters have been set by firms 
in the chain or by agents outside of the 
chain, how are they enforced? In an 
earlier paper (Humphrey and Schmitz 
2000), we focused on governance rela-
tionships between firms in the chain. In 
this article we stressed the trade-offs 
between parameter setting and enforce-
ment by firms within the chain as op-
posed to by external agents. 
Compliance with product parame-
ters can usually be monitored and en-
forced through inspection and testing. 
This can take place at various stages, 
                                                                   
contract electrical assemblers illustrates 
how these firms moved from assembling 
printed circuit boards to the specifications 
of their customers, using components sup-
plied by these customers, to sourcing com-
ponents, adapting designs and developing 
testing equipment. The key factor in the pa-
rameter-setting relationship was not the 
product (if anything, it became more com-
plicated) but the competence of the suppli-
ers in relation to the demands placed upon 
them. Note, however, that the overall de-
sign parameters of the product remain in 
the hands of the customer, as the printed 
circuit board's requirements depend upon 
the product into which it is inserted. How-
ever, because part of the answer to the de-
sign challenge is provided by the supplier, 
the nature of their relationship changes. 
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including at the design and pre-
production stages, depending upon the 
extent to which the supplier is responsi-
ble for the design. In some cases, gov-
ernment agencies will also inspect prod-
ucts prior to their introduction in the 
national or regional market.  
Monitoring and enforcing compli-
ance with process standards is altogether 
more complicated. Process standards 
relate to characteristics of the process 
itself, which may not be evident in the 
product itself. Reardon et al. (2001) use 
the concept of ‘credence good’ to refer 
to product and process qualities not 
evident at the point of purchase: 
“A credence good is a complex, new product 
with quality and/or safety aspects that 
cannot be known to consumers through 
sensory inspection or observation-in-
consumption... The quality and safety char-
acteristics that constitute credence attributes 
include the following: (1) food safety; (2) 
healthier, more nutritional foods (low-fat, 
low-salt, etc.); (3) authenticity; (4) produc-
tion processes that promote a safe environ-
ment and sustainable agriculture; (5) ‘fair 
trade’ attributes (e.g. working conditions).” 
(Reardon et al. 2001) 
By definition, consumers cannot di-
rectly verify these attributes. In the cases 
of attributes 3, 4 and 5, the retailers are 
not able to verify them through product 
inspection alone. This is why process 
controls are necessary. 
The following simplified table pre-
sents various options for parameter 
setting and parameter enforcing. Ignor-
ing more complex situations, such as 
joint parameter setting between firms 
and external agencies, it highlights the 
contrast between parameter setting and 
enforcement by firms in the chain (or by 
agents specifically contracted to carry 
out work to the requirements of these 
firms) and the role of external agents in 
setting and enforcing compliance with 
parameters.  
There are some reasons to expect 
that parameters set by lead firms within 
the chain will be enforced by the lead 
firms, or by agents contracted by them. 
Conversely, parameters set by agents 
external to the chain will also be en-
forced by agents external to the chain. 
These are the two situations described in 
boxes 1 and 4. In the case of box 1, the 
greater the extent to which the lead firm 
specifies non-standard parameters, the 
greater is the likelihood that it will also 
have to arrange for enforcement, carry-
ing out this activity directly, or contract-
ing others to do it. These ‘others’ might 
be other agents within the chain (for 
example, UK supermarkets requiring 
their importers to monitor the quality 
systems of horticultural producers and 
exporters), or third party specifically 
hired for the task, as happens when 
NGOs or independent monitors are hired 
by companies to verify labour standards 
at suppliers. The key point here is not 
whether the firm or an agent does this 
work, but that the firm defines the pa-
rameters to be met and arranges for 
compliance to be monitored. In contrast, 
box 4 describes cases where the parame-
ters are specified by agents external to 
the chain (in the two cases described, by 
government agencies) and the monitor-
ing processes are also in the hands of 
agents external to the chain. In this case, 
no individual firm in the chain takes 
responsibility for defining or enforcing 
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the parameters. They apply to all the 
firms in the chain. 
However, the table also shows that 
setting and enforcement may be split. 
Box 2 describes cases where lead firms 
require the suppliers to adhere to certain 
general process standards. The decision 
to insist on a standard is made by the 
lead firm (it is not imposed from out-
side), but if the standard is widely 
known and adopted, then it is likely that 
organisations (standards agencies, con-
sultancy firms, etc.) exist for both certi-
fying companies and helping firms meet 
the specified standard. Box 3 describes 
cases where the parameters are imposed 
by external agents (by governments or 
by NGOs), but the lead firm is responsi-
ble for specifying and monitoring the 
processes which are meant to lead to the 
required outcome. In these cases, the 
lead firm has a particular requirement 
imposed on it, but it has to make the 
necessary arrangements to ensure com-
pliance along the chain. 
We can hypothesise that there is 
some incentive for firms to shift parame-
ter setting and enforcement from boxes 1 
and 3 to boxes 2 and 4. Such a shift 
would reduce the cost of direct monitor-
ing and entail a process of external 
Table 1: Examples of Parameter Setting and Enforcement 
 Parameter Enforcement 
 Lead Firm External Agents 
 
 
 
Lead Firm 
1 
Specification of quality systems and 
enforcement through audit, either 
directly by the lead firm itself or 
through an agent acting directly on its 
instructions. 
Requirement for labour standards above 
the legally required minimum, verified 
by the lead firm or its agents. 
Voluntary implementation of fair trade 
code enforced by the firm. 
2 
Lead firm requires suppliers to conform 
to a process standard or code of practice 
for which an independent monitoring or 
certification system exists.  Examples 
would include ISO 9000, ISO 14000 and 
SA 8000 certification.1 
 
Pa
ra
m
et
er
 S
et
tin
g 
 
 
 
 
External 
Agents 
3 
Firms are expected not to use suppliers 
that employ child labour, but this expec-
tation is not accompanied by any sys-
tem for enforcing the ban.  The firms 
have to develop their own enforcement 
systems. 
Food sellers are legally obliged to meet 
hygiene standards for ready-to-eat food 
in the EU, but the process of ensuring 
that these conditions are met is the 
responsibility of firms in the chain.  In 
this case, the seller is responsible for 
specifying mechanisms that conceal that 
the standard can be met.  
4 
The EU requires that surgical instrument 
manufacturers exporting to the European 
market must be ISO 9000 certified. The 
certification is carried out by independ-
ent certification agencies (Nadvi 2001). 
The US Department of Agriculture 
(DoA) requires certain regions exporting 
melons to the US market to have a state-
administered fruit-fly monitoring and 
eradication programme which has to be 
approved by the DoA (Gomes 1999). 
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certification. Generally speaking, the 
costs of this certification are borne by 
the supplier, not the buyer. However, for 
this process to take place it is necessary 
for the parameters being specified to be 
widely applicable across different firms 
and to have credible means of external 
monitoring and enforcement. It may be 
the case that in the early stages of the 
development of new process parameters, 
such as labour standards, these are ini-
tially enforced by lead firms within the 
chain. As standards become more gener-
alised, then external systems of en-
forcement develop, such as the SA 8000 
labour standard. 
To the extent that such external sys-
tems of parameter setting and enforce-
ment develop and gain credibility, then 
the role of process parameters in gener-
ating the need for governance by firms 
within the chain will decline. If it were 
the case that certification systems dem-
onstrating adherence to a range of proc-
ess standards, including quality, envi-
ronmental and labour standards were 
developed, this might substitute for 
process controls by lead firms. Direct 
monitoring and control of suppliers 
could be substituted by certification 
processes. Nevertheless, there are rea-
sons to believe that direct parameter 
setting and enforcement by lead firms 
will continue to be important in value 
chains. First, firms might still wish to 
specify product parameters. Second, it is 
not clear how effective standards and 
certification are. Widely applicable 
process parameters may not be a guaran-
tee of good performance in areas such as 
quality. Close links with suppliers may 
remain indispensable. Third, there may 
be other areas of supplier behaviour, 
such as reliability of delivery and will-
ingness to develop long-term partner-
ships that are not captured by certifica-
tion schemes.  
6. What are the Likely 
Trends in Chain  
Governance? 
The purpose of this final section is to 
reflect on whether chain governance will 
become more or less dominant in trade 
with developing countries and what form 
it will take. What are the implications of 
the analysis presented in this article for 
trends in value-chain governance?  
• The general increase in chain gov-
ernance is connected to the big 
changes in retailing in the advanced 
countries. There has been an enor-
mous concentration in retailing, par-
ticularly pronounced in the US and 
UK, but also evident in Germany, 
France, and more recently in coun-
tries with traditionally very diffuse 
retail sectors, such as Italy and Ja-
pan.  Concentration in retailing does 
not necessarily lead to concentration 
in sourcing but the scenario that is 
emerging is increasingly clear: an in-
creasing number of developing-
country producers engage in contract 
manufacturing for a decreasing num-
ber of global buyers. 
• Brands play an increasingly impor-
tant role in enterprise strategy, par-
ticularly in consumer products such 
as garments and footwear. The 
enormous investment required to 
create (or maintain) brands is in-
creasingly made by retailers or other 
companies which have no (or only 
limited) production facilities of their 
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own. Product and process definition, 
however, is a strategic part of their 
operation. To the extent that luxury 
segments of markets for products 
such as clothes and shoes become 
dominated by global brands, the 
companies holding these brands will 
play an increasing role in structuring 
global value chains. This tendency is 
already evident in parts of the Italian 
footwear industry (Rabellotti 2001).8 
Because brands stand for high qual-
ity or well-defined images, lead 
firms need to define and enforce 
product and process parameters. 
Branding and chain governance thus 
tend to go together. Chain govern-
ance is not, however, limited to the 
sourcing of branded products. 
• In this article we have reiterated our 
previous argument (Humphrey and 
Schmitz 2000) that the risk of sup-
plier failure is a key driver of chain 
governance. Will this risk diminish 
with time? The risk of suppliers not 
being able to produce to the required 
specification is highest in new pro-
ducer countries. Over the last two 
decades, many new producer coun-
tries have been able to export to ad-
vanced country markets under the tu-
telage of the global buyers. As the 
competence of these suppliers in-
creases, chain governance through 
the buyers can be expected to loosen 
– provided that the increasing com-
petence of suppliers is accompanied 
by the emergence of local agents 
who can monitor and enforce the 
                                                 
8 This and other papers from the same 
workshop on local clusters in global value 
chains can be downloaded from the re-
search programme's website: 
www.ids.ac.uk/ids/global/vw.html. 
compliance with general or buyer-
specific standards. Some of the for-
merly new producers will become 
world leaders in producing promptly 
to the specification of the foreign 
buyer. To some extent this is already 
happening as in the Taiwanese com-
puter cluster (Kishimoto 2001) and 
the South Brazilian footwear cluster 
(Bazan and Navas-Aleman 2001), 
both of which are loosening the ties 
with the foreign buyers. 
• There is, however, a counter-
tendency. While non-price factors 
(quality, brand, speed) have come to 
play an increasing role for competing 
in global markets, price competition 
continues to be unrelenting, leading 
to a downward pressure on prices, 
particularly in labour-intensive prod-
ucts sourced from developing coun-
tries. The resulting profit squeeze 
leads buyers to scout continuously 
for new producers who offer lower 
labour costs. This then raises again 
the risk of supplier failure and the 
need for chain governance. While 
this process has probably bottomed 
out in traditional products such as 
garments and shoes, the cycle con-
tinues to be reproduced for newer 
products such as computer monitors 
or all-year-round available fruits and 
vegetables. 
• Business-to-Business (B2B) elec-
tronic commerce is being promoted 
worldwide as a means of enabling 
developing-country producers to sell 
in developed-country markets and 
transform the relationship between 
producer and buyer. For the pro-
ducer, one of the main advantages of 
e-commerce is thought to lie in side-
stepping the intermediary or avoid-
ing control by the buyer. Reality is 
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unlikely to become this simple and 
the governance mechanisms outlined 
in Table 1 will probably continue to 
be most relevant because: (a) B2B e-
commerce is diffusing only very 
slowly in trade between developing 
and developed countries; (b) some of 
the established buyers are investing 
in the application of e-procurement 
methods; (c) where existing interme-
diaries are circumvented, trade tends 
to be conducted through new ‘info-
mediaries’ (portals); (d) all forms of 
e-procurement are likely to require 
mechanisms to contain buyer risk, 
such as certification. Monitoring and 
accreditation agencies will be of in-
creasing importance (Mansell 2001).  
• As argued in Section 5, there may be 
a shift to parameter setting and en-
forcement by agents outside the 
chain. The more confor-
mance/compliance with parameters 
can be codified, generalised and 
credibly applied, the less need there 
is for governance from within the 
chain.  
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HOW DOES INSERTION IN 
GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS 
AFFECT UPGRADING IN 
INDUSTRIAL CLUSTERS? 
 
What is the scope for local upgrading 
strategies where producers operate in global 
value chains? The literature on industrial 
clusters emphasises the role of local institu-
tions and networks in enabling upgrading. 
The value chain literature focuses on the 
role of global buyers and chain governance 
in defining upgrading opportunities. This 
paper reconciles these two literatures by 
unpackaging the concept of governance and 
distinguishing between types of upgrading. 
It pays particular attention to the position of 
developing country firms selling to large, 
global buyers.  
 
1. Introduction 
Firms in developing countries, in com-
mon with firms everywhere, are under 
pressure to improve their performance 
and increase their competitiveness. New, 
low-cost producers are entering global 
markets, intensifying competition in 
markets for labour-intensive manufac-
tures. How can firms in developing 
countries respond to this type of chal-
lenge while at the same time maintaining 
returns to both labour and capital from 
engaging in trade? The literature on 
competitiveness suggests that the most 
viable response is to ‘upgrade’ - to make 
better products, make them more effi-
ciently, or move into more skilled activi-
ties.  
Several schools of thought have 
emphasised the local determinants of 
competitiveness, arguing that local-level 
governance supports cluster upgrading. 
These include the ‘new economic geog-
raphy’, business studies, regional science 
and innovation studies. Not only are 
some of these studies optimistic about 
the possibility of strengthening competi-
tiveness through local or regional indus-
trial policy (e.g. Cooke and Morgan, 
1998; Pyke 1992), but it has also been 
argued that in a globalising economy the 
only enduring basis for competitive 
advantage will be localised and based on 
tacit knowledge: "the formation of the 
world market...increases the importance 
of heterogeneous, localised capabilities 
for building firm-specific competences" 
(Maskell and Malmberg 1999: 172). The 
analysis of industrial clusters in develop-
ing countries builds on these perspec-
tives, focusing on the role of local link-
ages in generating competitive advan-
tage in labour-intensive export industries 
such as footwear and garments.1 How-
ever, these products are precisely the 
ones in which global buyers, whether 
agents, retailers or brand-name compa-
nies have come to play an increasingly 
important role in the organisation of 
global production and distribution sys-
tems. One of the main literatures which 
analyses these systems, the global value 
chain approach,2 takes a very different 
approach to the question of upgrading, 
emphasising cross-border linkages be-
tween firms in global production and 
distribution systems rather than local 
                                                 
1 A number of contributions to the develop-
ing countries literature on clusters of firms 
can be found in Nadvi and Schmitz (1999). 
2 Gereffi and others (Gereffi and Kor-
zeniewicz 1994) used the term "global 
commodity chains" to refer to these link-
ages. At a workshop in Bellagio in Septem-
ber 2000, Gereffi and other researchers 
working in this area agreed to use the term 
"global value chains". 
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linkages (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 
1994; Gereffi and Kaplinsky 2001).  
How can these two literatures be 
reconciled? One emphasises the impor-
tance of local linkages and the other 
global linkages. Clearly there is a need 
to bring these two perspectives together, 
particularly in the case of export oriented 
clusters that are inserted into global 
value chains. This paper provides a 
means of doing this.  
The question which drives this pa-
per is how insertion into global value 
chains affects local upgrading strategies. 
We came to this question through our 
research on clusters in developing coun-
tries whose producers found themselves 
in asymmetrical relationships with their 
customers. These producers were facing 
powerful global buyers who had a major 
influence not just on sales but also on the 
type of upgrading strategies open to 
them. Since then, we found that this 
issue is not confined to developing 
country clusters. Rabellotti (2001) finds 
a similar problem facing shoe producers 
in Italy. 
This paper is organised divided into 
three further sections. Section 2 dis-
cusses the treatment of upgrading in the 
cluster and value chain literatures. Sec-
tion 3 distinguishes between different 
forms of governance in global value 
chains and analyses their determinants. 
Section 4 considers the prospects for 
upgrading in clusters inserted into global 
value chains.  
2. Upgrading in Clusters 
and Value Chains 
As more and more developing country 
producers are integrated into global 
markets, there is downwards pressure on 
the prices of both agricultural and manu-
factured products. For producers to 
maintain or increase incomes in the face 
of this pressure, they must either in-
crease the skills content of their activi-
ties and/or move into market niches 
which have entry barriers and are there-
fore insulated to some extent from these 
pressures. This is the logic of "high 
road" strategies for developing local 
industrial capabilities. We refer to shifts 
in activities which sustain higher in-
comes as upgrading. In the context of 
this paper, we are particularly concerned 
with four types of upgrading that firms 
or groups of firms within a value chain 
might strive to achieve: 
• Process upgrading: firms can up-
grade processes - transforming inputs 
into outputs more efficiently by re-
organising the production system or 
introducing superior technology.  
• Product upgrading: firms can up-
grade by moving into more sophisti-
cated product lines (which can be de-
fined in terms of increased unit val-
ues).  
• Functional upgrading: firms acquire 
new functions (or abandon existing 
functions) so that they increase the 
overall skill content of their activi-
ties. For example, they might com-
plement production with design or 
marketing, or move out of low-value 
production activities altogether. 
• Intersectoral upgrading: firms apply 
the competence acquired in a particu-
lar function of a chain to move into a 
new sector. For example, compe-
tence in producing TVs is used to 
make monitors and thus move into 
the computer sector. Such horizontal 
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moves into new sectors seem to have 
been central to Taiwan’s ability to 
gain a foothold in skill intensive sec-
tors. 
Both the cluster and value chain literatu-
res emphasise the role played by gover-
nance in upgrading. Governance is a 
term with confused and overlapping 
meanings. It can be used to refer to the 
exercise of authority within institutions 
or polities. In the analysis of economic 
transactions, it is sometimes used in a 
wide sense to refer to any mode of co-
ordination of activities, including mar-
kets, firms and networks. This is the 
sense in which Williamson (1979) uses 
the term. Governance can also be defi-
ned more narrowly, referring solely to 
co-ordination through networks. In this 
paper, economic governance denotes co-
ordination of economic activities 
through non-market relationships. This 
use of the term retains the essence of 
governance, namely that some kind of 
steering of activities takes place (Jessop 
1998).  
This steering can involve the co-
ordination of activities within and be-
tween firms. However, it can also in-
volve public actors and co-operation 
between public and private actors. The 
cluster literature, for example, empha-
sises governance through local-level 
inter-firm networks, business associa-
tions and public and public-private 
institutions. The importance of local 
governance as a source of competitive-
ness has been particularly stressed in two 
lines of recent work: regional science 
(and in particular the industrial district 
literature) and innovation studies.3 These 
two bodies of work both consider market 
dynamics insufficient to achieve com-
petitiveness via the high road, i.e. 
through upgrading. 
In the industrial district literature, 
the connection between governance and 
upgrading was first established by 
Brusco (1990). The experience of the 
"Third Italy" and other European experi-
ences gave rise (in the late 1980s/early 
1990s) to a new model of local/regional 
industrial policy which (1) emphasises 
delegation of functions to a diverse 
range of governmental and non-
governmental institutions; (2) operates 
through institutions close to the enter-
prise (3) extends the concern with entre-
preneurship from the private to the 
public sector; and (4) stresses self-help 
through business associations and pro-
ducer consortia. In other words, the 
proposition is that the development and 
rapid diffusion of knowledge within the 
cluster are not solely the result of inci-
dental synergies, the ‘industrial atmos-
phere’, but are fostered by policy net-
works of public and private actors (Scott, 
1996). This has led to a new emphasis on 
the region as a nexus of learning and 
innovation effects (for example, Storper 
1995) and francophone writings on the 
milieu innovateur (Maillat 1996). 
The importance of local policy net-
works is also central to the work on local 
                                                 
3 The question of locality is also emphasised 
in the ‚New Economic Geography’ of 
Krugman and others (Krugman 1995) and 
in the work of Michael Porter (Porter 
1998), but both play down public gover-
nance issues, seeing local competitive ad-
vantage arise from market dynamics and in-
ter-firm networks. 
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innovation systems. In the 1990s the 
literature concerned with technological 
development moved from a focus on the 
individual firm and a strong distinction 
between innovation and diffusion to-
wards a greater concern with learning-
by-interaction (Lundvall 1993) and then 
with innovation systems, first at the 
national then increasingly at the regional 
and local level (Freeman 1995; Edquist 
1997, among others). While the cluster 
literature comes from a tradition (starting 
with Alfred Marshall) which emphasised 
the production system and the proximity 
of firms, the work on local innovation 
systems was from the beginning more 
concerned with the knowledge system, 
the importance of knowledge enhancing 
organisations, and the benefits of con-
sciously pursued complementarity. The 
most important thing to emphasise, 
however, is that both see local govern-
ance aimed at fostering upgrading and 
competitiveness is an essential comple-
ment to the incidental synergies arising 
from agglomeration.  
Both these approaches have been 
used to analyse local industrial develop-
ment in developing countries (Cassiolato 
and Lastres 1999; Nadvi 1999; Rabellotti 
1997; Schmitz 1995a). Their application 
has been characterised by the concentra-
tion on the division of labour between 
firms within the cluster. Product and 
process upgrading are seen as being 
driven largely by firms and institutions 
within the cluster. Functional upgrading 
is rarely given much attention, partly 
because it is assumed that all the relevant 
functions are already contained within 
the cluster. Divisions of labour between 
the cluster and outside agents are not 
given relatively little attention.  
The literature on global value chains 
takes a very different view of inter-firm 
linkages and knowledge flows. It is also 
concerned with upgrading but the 
knowledge required to do so flows 
through the chain. Particular attention 
has given to the role of powerful lead 
firms that ‘undertake the functional 
integration and co-ordination of interna-
tionally dispersed activities’ (Gereffi 
1999: 41). By governing the chain, these 
global lead firms also structure the up-
grading opportunities of local producers.  
Global value chain analysis empha-
sises that local producers learn a great 
deal from global buyers about how to 
improve their production processes, 
attain consistent and high quality, and 
increase the speed of response. This 
upgrading effect is particularly signifi-
cant for local producers new to the 
global market (Keesing and Lall 1992; 
Piore and Ruiz Durán 1998; Schmitz and 
Knorringa 2000). There is also scope for 
product upgrading. Gereffi attributes this 
to ‘organisational succession’, a process 
by which manufacturers start producing 
for buyers catering for the low end of the 
market and then move up to buyers 
targeting more sophisticated market 
segments: ‘This succession of foreign 
buyers thus permitted manufacturers to 
upgrade their facilities as they met buyer 
demands for more sophisticated prod-
ucts’ (Gereffi 1999: 53). It can also arise 
when the lead firms in the chain look to 
upgrade their final product offering. 
Dolan and Humphrey (2000) argue that 
in the fresh vegetables sector, supermar-
kets drive product upgrading by intro-
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ducing more sophisticated processing 
and packaging, as well as entirely new 
product lines.  
There differing views about func-
tional upgrading in value chains. The 
most optimistic view is that of Gereffi, 
based on his research on the garment 
chain. He concludes that producers 
gaining access to the chain have good 
prospects for upgrading within produc-
tion and subsequently into design, mar-
keting and branding as a consequence of 
a combination of ‘learning by exporting’ 
and ‘organisational succession’. One 
clear example of upgrading among 
developing countries producers would be 
the case of East Asian garment produc-
ers. According to Gereffi (1999: 47), 
they moved from (a) assembly of im-
ported inputs, to (b) taking care of the 
entire production process including the 
sourcing of inputs, to (c) design of prod-
ucts sold under the brands of other firms, 
and finally to (d) the sale of their own 
branded merchandise in internal and 
external markets.4 
Others researchers are more pessi-
mistic. Martin Bell at SPRU, University 
of Sussex, has referred to the Gereffi 
scenario as the ‘benign escalator’ (per-
sonal communication). While the pro-
gression from (a) to (b) is not controver-
sial, moving to stages (c) and (d) cannot 
be taken for granted. Research on the 
footwear chain suggests that in some 
chains global buyers discourage, if not 
obstruct, design, marketing and branding 
by local producers (Schmitz and Knor-
ringa 2000). Local producers face obsta-
cles because such upgrading encroaches 
                                                 
4 In the electronics industry, similar upgra-
ding paths are described by Hobday (1995) 
and by Sturgeon (2001). 
Table 1: Governance and upgrading clusters vs. value chains 
 Clusters Value Chains 
Governance within 
the locality 
Strong local governance characterised 
by close inter-firm co-operation and 
active private and public institutions.  
Not discussed. Local inter-firm co-
operation and government policy 
largely ignored.  
Relations with the 
external world 
External relations not theorised, or 
assumed (by default) to be based on 
arm’s length market transactions. 
Strong governance within the chain. 
International trade increasingly man-
aged through inter-firm networks.  
Upgrading Emphasis on incremental upgrading 
(learning by doing) and the spread of 
innovations through interactions 
within the cluster. For major upgrad-
ing initiatives, local innovation cen-
tres play an important role. 
Incremental upgrading made possible 
through learning by doing and the 
allocation of new tasks by the chain’s 
lead firm. Discontinuous upgrading 
made possible by ‘organisational 
succession’ allowing entry into more 
complex value chains. 
Key competitive 
challenge 
Promoting collective efficiency 
through interactions within the clus-
ter. 
Gaining access to chains and develop-
ing linkages with major customers. 
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on their buyers’ core competence. In 
other words, power relations may inhibit 
upgrading and limit knowledge flows 
within the chain.  
The literatures on clusters and 
chains suggest quite distinct upgrading 
opportunities and trajectories for firms in 
developing countries. Both emphasise 
the importance of upgrading in order to 
sustain incomes in the face of increasing 
competition in global markets, but the 
routes to this same end are different. The 
differences are summarised in Table 1. 
The cluster literature emphasises the 
importance of local-level governance 
and the role of incremental upgrading 
through inter-firm interactions and local 
institutions. Even the resources for 
product and functional upgrading are 
seen mainly to come from within the 
locality. Links with the wider world are 
frequently acknowledged, but they are 
weakly theorised.5 Overall, the external 
world is characterised as a market pre-
senting competitive challenges that must 
be met through improved organisation 
and effort within the cluster.  
In contrast, the value chain literature 
focuses on global linkages, leaving the 
locality largely untheorised. Little atten-
tion is given to the role of business 
associations and local inter-firm co-
operation in competitiveness and up-
grading.6 Upgrading occurs as a result of 
learning by exporting, buyer promotion 
of the capabilities of developing country 
producers or by entering value chains 
                                                 
5 See Bell and Albu (1999) for a discussion 
of this point. 
6 The role of national policies is also under-
played. 
with more demanding customers. In 
other words, the then knowledge re-
quired for upgrading flows down 
through the chain, and customers are the 
most important source of knowledge 
about processes and markets.  
While the table may overdraw the 
differences, both approaches fail to 
address the question of what might be 
the governance and upgrading dynamics 
of clusters that are inserted into global 
value chains. In order to resolve the 
apparent contradiction between the 
approaches, two steps are required. 
Firstly, it is necessary to distinguish 
between different forms of governance 
in global value chains and recognise the 
reasons why they exist. Secondly, it is 
necessary to understand the way in 
which competences are acquired at the 
level of the firm and the cluster. This 
will allow a better understanding the 
effects of both global and local linkages 
on various kinds of upgrading. 
3. Value Chain Governance 
Global value chain analysis emerged 
initially out of a recognition of the role 
of global buyers in creating global pro-
duction and marketing networks. Gereffi 
(1994) emphasised the importance of 
what he called "buyer-driven global 
commodity chains" in the garments 
industry. In extreme cases, large retailers 
or brand-name companies organised 
production systems that integrated pro-
ducers in various countries but without 
themselves owning any manufacturing 
facilities. Work on horticultural exports 
from Africa (Dolan and Humphrey, 
2000) showed how UK supermarkets 
exercised a decisive influence over 
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production and processing in African 
countries even though the producers, 
exporters and UK importers were inde-
pendent companies.  
In these two cases, the role of pow-
erful lead firms in steering the entire 
chain is clear. However, not all chains 
have these characteristics. Co-ordination 
in value chains may also take place 
predominantly through arms-length 
market relationships. Firms in a supply 
chain may share competences and deci-
sion-making. Finally, activities in a 
supply chain may be brought under the 
direct control of a firm through vertical 
integration. This leads us to distinguish 
between four ways in which relation-
ships between activities in a value chain 
might be managed: arm's-length market 
relationships, networks, quasi-hierarchy, 
and hierarchy.  
Why do these different governance 
structures arise? Governance clearly 
involves co-ordination. One way of 
discussing this is to consider the act of 
governance as involving parameter 
setting and enforcement. At any point in 
the chain, activities are defined by three 
key parameters: 
1. What is to be produced. This in-
volves the design of products, both 
in broad conception and detailed 
specifications.  
2. How it is to be produced. This 
involves the definition of production 
processes, which can include ele-
ments such as the technology to be 
used, quality systems, labour stan-
dards and environmental standards. 
3. Physical product flow: how much is 
to be produced, when, and how the 
flow of product along the chain is to 
be handled. 
Chain governance arises when non-
market co-ordination of activities along 
the chain is required: agents at one point 
in the chain set the parameters followed 
by agents at one or more other points in 
the chain. But why should firms wish to 
specify product, process and logistics 
parameters?  
Buyer specification of product de-
sign tends to arise in two circumstances. 
Firstly, it is needed when manufacturers 
make products with integral architecture, 
with the consequence that they require a 
high level of customised components. 
Secondly, it arises when the buyer has a 
better understanding of the demands of 
the market than the supplier. The buyer 
then interprets the needs of the market 
and informs the supplier of what is 
required. The supplier's limited knowl-
edge of market demands may arise in 
fast-moving markets characterised by 
innovation and product differentiation. It 
also arises when developing country 
suppliers are integrated into global value 
chains and exposed to the demands of 
more sophisticated markets. As Hobday 
has argued, the ‘latecomer’ firm to the 
global economy is “dislocated from the 
mainstream international markets it 
wishes to supply” (Hobday 1995: 34).  
The main reason for specification of 
process parameters along the chain is to 
contain risk. Buyers specify (and en-
force) process parameters when there are 
potential losses arising from a failure to 
meet commitments (for example, deliv-
ering the right product on time) or a 
failure to meet certain product or process 
standards. These performance risks, 
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relating to factors such as quality, re-
sponse time and reliability of delivery, 
become more important as firms engage 
in non-price competition. They also 
increase as developing country produc-
ers are faced with increasingly complex 
standards relating to both products and 
processes required for product sold in 
industrialised countries. Once again, 
compliance with the standards might be 
achieved through the application generic 
standards such as ISO 9000 (quality 
systems) and ISO 14000 (environmental 
standards) and SA 8000 (social stan-
dards), but firms may not be prepared to 
rely on third party standards and auditing 
in sensitive areas.  
Specification of logistics parameters 
along the chain is likely to arise when 
there is a degree of task complexity 
and/or time pressure that requires co-
ordination of tasks across firms. This 
tends to increase not only as competition 
on the basis of product innovation in-
creases, but also as a result of the speci-
fications of product and process parame-
ters. This narrows down the range of 
available suppliers and makes it impos-
sible to buy products from inventory 
carried by intermediaries. 
It is important to recognise that not 
all parameter setting along the chain 
results in chain governance. For exam-
ple, buyers can customise products by 
choosing from a predetermined range of 
options, or provide detailed product 
drawings from which products can be 
produced by generic equipment. Helper 
(1993) describes how this system was 
used in the US auto industry before the 
1980s. It allowed the assemblers to 
maintain a large number of potential 
suppliers. Similarly, buyers may enforce 
process standards while maintaining 
arm's-length market relationships by 
insisting that suppliers conform to ge-
neric standards, such as ISO 9000.7 
However, parameters setting is fre-
quently achieved through the develop-
ment of governance structures in value 
chains. To the extent that specifying or 
monitoring compliance with product and 
process parameters requires transaction-
specific investments in relationships 
with suppliers, relationships in value 
chain are unlikely to be arm's-length. 
Hence governance is involved. 
Governance structures enable set-
ting and enforcement of parameters. This 
is achieved by developing inter-firm 
relationships, by defining which sources 
of knowledge will be mobilised for use 
in the chain and to whom they will be 
transmitted and by creating mechanism 
to monitor compliance. In short, chain 
governance structures are the relation-
ships and institutional mechanisms 
through which non-market co-ordination 
of the chain is achieved. There is a con-
tinuum from arm's-length market rela-
tionships through to hierarchical govern-
ance (vertical integration). In between, 
there are two particularly important 
types of governance structures in global 
value chains: networks bringing together 
partners with complementary compe-
tences, and quasi hierarchy in which 
there is asymmetry of competence and 
power in favour of one party (frequently 
the global buyer). These four types of 
                                                 
7  This point is discussed in more detail in 
Humphrey and Schmitz (2001). 
JOHN HUMPHREY/HUBERT SCHMITZ 26
relationships can be characterised as 
follows: 
• Arm’s length market relations. Buyer 
and supplier do not develop close re-
lationships. This implies that the 
buyer (i) buys a standard product, or 
(ii) buys product made-to-order on 
the basis of predefined options, or 
(iii) provides drawings and, in effect, 
purchases producer's universal pro-
duction skills. This further implies 
that the buyer's requirements (includ-
ing quality, reliability, etc.) could be 
met by a range of firms. If process 
parameters are specified, they are 
met through the application of non-
transaction specific standards, fre-
quently verified by independent cer-
tification. 
• Networks. Firms co-operate in a 
close and even relationship. There 
has to be some reason for incurring 
the costs of co-operation, and is usu-
ally arises from the need for collabo-
ration on product development 
and/or production scheduling. The 
relationship is characterised by the 
sharing of competences and recipro-
cal dependence.8 In this case, the 
buyer may specify certain process 
standards to be attained, but the sup-
plier should be confident enough to 
work out how to meet them. 
• Quasi hierarchy . One firm exercises 
a high degree of control over other 
firms, frequently specifying the char-
acteristics of the product be pro-
duced, and sometimes specifying the 
processes to be followed and the 
                                                 
8 For a discussion of the role of complemen-
tary competences in the creation of network 
relationships between firms, see Richardson 
(1972) and Palpacuer (2000). 
control mechanisms to be enforced. 
This level of control can arise not 
only from the lead firm's role in de-
fining the product, but also from the 
buyer's perceived risk of losses from 
the suppliers’ performance failures. 
In other words, there are some 
doubts about the competence of the 
supplier. This is the typical form of 
governance in a buyer-driven value 
chain. The lead firm in the chain may 
exercise control not only over its di-
rect suppliers but also further along 
the chain.9 
• Hierarchy. The lead firm takes direct 
ownership of operations in the chain.  
Clearly, the specification of product, 
process and logistics parameters can lead 
to increasing vertical integration. How-
ever, global value chain analysis has 
identified a number of tendencies in the 
world economy which are likely to 
promote the development of quasi-
hierarchy. The parameters are specified, 
but without ownership. Four factors, in 
particular, can be mentioned: 
• Product differentiation and innova-
tion have become increasingly im-
portant sources of competitive ad-
vantage. Insofar as they require cus-
tomised, complex exchanges be-
tween buyers and suppliers, they lead 
to network forms of governance. 
These have long been evident in 
some manufacturing industries, par-
ticularly those with integral product 
architectures. However, a new driver 
for the trend to quasi-hierarchy is in-
                                                 
9 This type of control is usually exercised by 
buyers over suppliers. However, there are 
cases where control moves in the other di-
rection, as with franchising operations or 
car dealerships. 
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creasing concentration in the retail 
sector. Large retailing firms – 
whether sourcing directly or through 
intermediaries - have become power-
ful global buyers. Frequently, these 
buyers focus on retailing but play an 
important role in product develop-
ment and branding. In the case of 
buyers such as supermarkets, the fact 
that they are responsible for stocking 
between 8,000 and 20,000 products 
in a single store means that for al-
most all products vertical integration 
is ruled out. However, their power 
and their use of product differentia-
tion and innovation in the pursuit of 
competitive advantage means that 
they actively manage the supply 
chain. 
• Final product markets are character-
ised by an increasing emphasis on 
safety, labour and environmental 
standards. This leads to the emer-
gence of "credence goods", which in 
the context of agricultural produce 
have been described as follows: 
"A credence good is a complex, new product 
with quality and/or safety aspects that 
cannot be known to consumers through 
sensory inspection or observation-in-
consumption... The quality and safety char-
acteristics that constitute credence attributes 
include the following: (1) food safety; (2) 
healthier, more nutritional foods (low-fat, 
low-salt, etc.); (3) authenticity; (4) produc-
tion processes that promote a safe environ-
ment and sustainable agriculture; (5) “fair 
trade” attributes (e.g., working conditions)" 
(Reardon et al. 2001). 
Credence goods require greater monitor-
ing and supervision of production proc-
esses to ensure that the claimed charac-
teristics are present and to convince 
consumers that they are present. Cre-
dence goods are particularly prevalent 
parts of the food industry, but pressure 
on retailers more generally to meet 
labour and environmental standards has 
been increasing. This pressure has come 
not only from consumer groups and 
NGOs, but also from governments. In 
addition, retailers and brand-name com-
panies themselves develop standards 
themselves as forms of product differen-
tiation. 
• There is a degree of task complexity 
and/or time pressure that requires co-
ordination of tasks across firms. This 
tends to increase as competition on 
the basis of product innovation and 
product availability increases. The 
elimination of stocks and the pres-
sure to reduce ‘time to market’ fa-
vour quasi-hierarchy.  
• In the pursuit of low-cost inputs in 
labour-intensive sector such as gar-
ments, global buyers are frequently 
looking to develop new sources of 
supply. As stressed by Keesing and 
Lall (1992), such new suppliers are 
expected to meet requirements that 
frequently do not (yet) apply to their 
domestic markets. This creates a gap 
between the capabilities required for 
the domestic market and those re-
quired for the export market. There-
fore, parameter setting and enforce-
ment may be required to ensure that 
products and processes meet the re-
quired standards. If the gap has to be 
closed quickly, buyers will need to 
invest in a few selected suppliers and 
help them to upgrade.  
If developing country producers find 
themselves increasingly in value chains 
controlled by global buyers, what are 
their upgrading prospects? The next 
section analyses this question. 
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4. Value Chain Relation-
ships and Upgrading in 
Clusters 
A key proposition of this paper is that 
the upgrading prospects of clusters differ 
according to the type of value chain they 
feed into. Different forms of chain gov-
ernance have different upgrading impli-
cations. Elsewhere (Humphrey and 
Schmitz 2000) we have set these out in a 
systematic and comparative way, focus-
sing in particular on the implications for 
developing country producers. The main 
conclusions were:  
• Insertion in a quasi-hierarchical 
chain offers very favourable condi-
tions for fast process and product 
upgrading but hinders functional up-
grading.  
• In chains characterised by market-
based relationships, process and 
product upgrading tend to be slower 
(not fostered by global buyers), but 
the road to functional upgrading is 
more open. 
• Chains characterised by even net-
works offer ideal upgrading condi-
tions but are the least likely for de-
veloping country producers because 
of the high level of (complementary) 
competences required. 
These conclusions arose from a com-
parative but largely static framework of 
analysis.10 In this paper we adopt a more 
dynamic approach and concentrate on 
the implications of operating in a quasi-
                                                 
10 These conclusions have been subjected to 
empirical investigation in a number of de-
veloping country and developed country 
clusters, for details see the papers on local 
and global governance available at 
www.ids.ac.uk/ids/global/vw.html. 
hierarchical chain. For the reasons set 
out at the end of last section, this type of 
chain is particularly relevant for export 
oriented developing country producers.  
Concentrating on quasi-hierachical 
chains means dealing with power and 
unequal relationships. The upgrading 
implications are illustrated in the follow-
ing subsection on the Brazilian shoe 
industry: it shows how global buyers 
both contributed to process and product 
upgrading of local producers and also 
placed limits on functional upgrading 
and market diversification. This is fol-
lowed by an analysis of how these limits 
can be overcome where firms pursue 
strategies for competence acquisition.  
4.1. Upgrading in the Sinos 
Valley Footwear Cluster 
The way upgrading possibilities in clus-
ters are influenced by their insertion in 
quasi-hierarchical value chains is illus-
trated by the case of the Sinos Valley 
shoe cluster in the South of Brazil.11 In 
the late 1960s, this cluster was composed 
predominantly of small firms producing 
for the domestic market. With the arrival 
of buyers from the United States, the 
characteristics of the cluster began to 
change. The external buyers looked for 
much larger volumes of standardised 
products, which led to the growth of 
large producers. By the late 1980s, a 
significant number of firms were large 
                                                 
11 The account which follows is based on 
Schmitz (1995b; 1999). This discussion fo-
cuses on shoe producers. For a discussion 
of upgrading in the footwear components 
sector in the Sinos Valley, see Bazan and 
Navas-Aleman (2001). 
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by shoe industry standards, employing 
more than 500 people. 
At one level, this integration into the 
US footwear value chain facilitated 
upgrading. Process standards rose as did 
product quality. The buyers studied the 
market, developed models and product 
specifications, helped producers in the 
choice of technology and organisation of 
production, inspected quality on site, and 
organised transport and payment. Firms 
in the Sinos Valley concentrated on the 
production process and the organisation 
of their own local supply chains, while 
the buyers (traders or retailers' agents) 
were responsible for product design and 
logistics. Local firms benefitted from 
this. They gained access to the US mar-
ket and grew very rapidly. 
The danger of this situation became 
evident when Chinese producers under-
cut Brazilian products in the US market 
in the early 1990s, and Brazilian produc-
ers were faced with sharply declining 
prices for their products. The upgrading 
imperative was clear, but the upgrading 
strategies of local lead firms favoured 
the sphere of production and neglected 
the areas of design and marketing. Al-
though the local business association 
developed a collective strategy of raising 
Brazil’s image in the world footwear 
markets and of strengthening design 
capabilities, these proposals were not put 
into practice. The largest export manu-
facturers did not support them because 
they feared that advancing into design 
and marketing would encroach on the 
core competence of the cluster's main 
buyer, which accounted for over 80 per 
cent of their output and close to 40 per 
cent of the total cluster output.  
This outcome is reflected in the per-
formance profile of the Sinos Valley in 
the late 1990s. Global buyers in the US 
and Europe rated the cluster's production 
abilities (production quality, speed of 
response, punctuality, flexibility) as 
matching the best of the world (i.e. 
Italy), but on innovative design it lagged 
far behind the Italians (Schmitz and 
Knorringa 2000). Clearly, the govern-
ance of the footwear export chain had 
upgraded production capabilities but had 
blocked the development of design 
capabilities. However, such design 
capabilities were developed by firms 
producing for the domestic market and 
for export market in Latin America 
(Bazan and Navas-Aleman 2001), and 
this point will be considered in the next 
section.  
4.2. Competence Acquisition in 
Clusters 
The Sinos Valley case raises important 
questions about governance and upgrad-
ing. It suggests that integration into 
global quasi-hierarchical chains is a two-
edged sword. On the one hand, it facili-
tates inclusion and rapid enhancement of 
product and process capabilities. Devel-
oping country firms are able to export 
into markets which would otherwise be 
difficult for them to penetrate. On the 
other hand, they become tied into rela-
tionships that prevent functional upgrad-
ing and leave them dependent on one or 
two powerful customers. In some cases, 
exclusive relationships with large buyers 
prevent them from diversifying their 
customer base. This further raises the 
cost of the "exit option", tying them to 
their key buyer.  
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However, it is important to recog-
nise that chain governance is a dynamic 
process, and there are two reasons for 
not being pessimistic about the opportu-
nities available to developing country 
clusters when inserted into quasi-
hierarchical chains. First, power is rela-
tional: the exercise of power by one 
party depends on the powerlessness of 
other parties in the chain. Existing pro-
ducers, or their spin offs, may acquire 
new competences and explore new 
markets, and this changes power rela-
tionships. Second, establishing and 
maintaining quasi-hierarchical govern-
ance is costly for the lead firm and leads 
to inflexibility because of transaction 
specific investments (and penalties if the 
exit option is exercised).  
This leads to a more optimistic view 
of the upgrading options of local pro-
ducers. However, a basic requirement for 
upgrading is the strategic intent of the 
firms involved. Without intra-firm in-
vestment in equipment, organisational 
arrangements and people, no substantial 
upgrading of any kind is possible. Bell 
(1984) has emphasised this a long time 
ago. One of the main lessons from the 
recent East Asian experience is that a 
significant number of firms, including 
small and medium-sized enterprises, 
made these investments and showed 
strategic intent (Hobday 1995; Kishi-
moto 2001). One of the consequences of 
the emphasis on relationships between 
firms (and/or institutions) in the debates 
on industrial clusters, innovation systems 
and value chains is that it crowds out the 
concern with what goes inside the firm.  
Where this strategic intent exists, 
various ways of breaking out of quasi-
hierarchy can be envisaged.12 The first, 
and perhaps most important one, is to 
use the knowledge acquired in working 
for their main global buyer and seek to 
use it in supplying other (probably 
smaller) markets in which relationships 
with the customers are more uneven. 
This is not easy. For example, Bazan and 
Navas-Aleman (2001) found that some 
Brazilian firms which were world class 
suppliers of very big US buyers found it 
difficult to succeed in the national or 
Latin American market. Manufacturing 
to tight specifications for the main cus-
tomer requires an internal organisation 
geared to this purpose and builds up 
competences which are highly developed 
but narrow (limited to the sphere of 
production). Entering new markets 
requires additional – or other combina-
tions – of competences. The importance 
of acquiring such competences is em-
phasised in Lee and Chen's (2000) 
analysis of contract manufacturers in the 
electronics industry in Taiwan. They 
argue that firms were able to acquire 
new competences by applying lessons 
from one part of their production to 
another. They could, for example, take a 
design supplied by one customer and 
then make adaptations and use the modi-
fied design to supply other customers in 
other markets. The emphasis on ‘other 
markets’ is critical. Where producers sell 
to powerful customers, they cannot 
                                                 
12 A dynamic approach would in particular 
look to the role of a new generation of 
managers in existing enterprises and, espe-
cially relevant in clusters, to the spin offs. 
Often they feel less constrained by the 
bonds with existing powerful customers and 
more able to take new initiatives. 
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compete directly with them and must 
find other products in markets when 
diversifying and upgrading.  
Another strategy is to move into 
functions which the lead firms governing 
the chain are willing to relinquish. Recall 
that lead firms establish quasi-
hierarchical relationships because of the 
risk of supplier failure. As competences 
in the supplying cluster increase, local 
firms may find that the lead firms vacate 
certain spaces. For example, in the first 
two decades of the Sinos Valley’s export 
growth, logistics from the factory gate to 
the warehouses in the US or Europe 
were controlled by the buyers. This 
function then began to be carried out by 
independent firms (most of them local) 
who compete fiercely for customers in 
this logistics market. A more significant 
example of functional upgrading by 
producers is given by Gereffi (1999). US 
garment buyers were willing to relin-
quish the organisation of the East Asian 
supply chain to Taiwanese manufactur-
ers. Lee and Chen (2000) and Kishimoto 
(2001), in their work on the electronics 
industry, suggest that some Taiwanese 
computer manufacturers began to take 
over functions such as the development 
of new processes and design adaptations. 
This upgrading drives changes in chain 
governance, evolving from quasi-
hierarchy to either network or market-
based relationships.  
Which form the new relationship 
takes and how far this process of func-
tional upgrading can go depends a) the 
type of buyer and b) the ability of the 
producers to make (individually or 
collectively) the required investment. 
Buyers who consider sourcing as their 
core competence are unlikely to leave 
the management of the supply chain to 
their producers. In contrast, buyers who 
see their core competence in marketing 
and branding, are less likely to retain this 
function. Thus the likelihood of conflict 
or not will depend on the type of buyer.  
Conflict or not, the ability to invest 
in the acquisition of new competences is 
critical. This is clear from the innovation 
literature, especially Bell (1984). This 
literature tends to emphasise the invest-
ment requirements in the sphere of 
production, especially technical change. 
Often these are indeed formidable. How-
ever, in the labour intensive products 
typically exported by developing coun-
tries, the biggest entry barriers are in the 
sphere of marketing and branding, as is 
recognised by Lall (1991) and Hobday 
(1995). Only large developing country 
firms can make the investment required, 
and it is highly risky. In some cases, the 
way forward is a collective investment. 
Brazilian shoe and component producers 
are trying to establish a collective brand 
(Bazan and Navas-Aleman 2001).  
It seems reasonable to assume that 
the greater the leap in upgrading, the less 
likely it is that firms can use knowledge 
acquired linkages. Therefore they will 
have to rely to a greater extent on local 
and national sources of innovation. In 
particular, inter-sectoral upgrading, 
which involves the switch of firms from 
one sector to another, which is one of the 
characteristics of Taiwanese industriali-
sation, would seem to depend heavily on 
local and national systems of innovation. 
The fact that upgrading is commonly 
seen in East Asia but relatively rare in 
other parts of the world is almost cer-
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tainly related to the characteristics of 
industry policy and innovation systems 
in these countries. The converse conclu-
sion is that incremental innovation is 
more likely to draw upon resources from 
within the value chain.  
5. Conclusion 
The recognition of the importance of 
clustering has put economic geography 
back at the centre of the economic de-
velopment debate in both developed and 
less developed countries. However, the 
preoccupation with the quality of local 
linkages has led to a neglect of the 
global linkages. The global value chain 
approach emphasises that - in many 
cases - the clustering producers do not 
sell into open market and that the chains 
which connect the local producers with 
the distant retailers are subject to gov-
ernance by powerful lead firms. The 
purpose of this paper was to set out the 
implications of this global chain govern-
ance for local upgrading.  
The central proposition of the paper 
is that local upgrading opportunities vary 
with the way chains are governed. Dis-
tinguishing between different forms of 
upgrading and different forms of chain 
co-ordination is central to this analysis. 
Equally important, one needs to under-
stand why certain firms seek to govern 
the chain, given that effective govern-
ance requires substantial investment. The 
paper explains these reasons and the 
upgrading implications, focussing on the 
case of developing country producers 
and the relationship they typically find 
themselves in when exporting to devel-
oped-country markets. Such chains are 
often characterised by what we call 
quasi-hierarchy: the global buyers set 
product parameters in order to determine 
product design and process parameters to 
reduce the risks associated with non-
compliance with standards. Recent 
studies suggest that quasi-hierarchical 
governance promotes fast upgrading for 
local producers in the sphere of produc-
tion, but these firms find it difficult to 
move into higher value activities. This 
paper shows how local producers can 
break out of the ‘lock-in’ which results 
from working for a small number of 
global buyers. It recognises the fragility 
of global chain governance and the 
opening up new opportunities for local 
producers. Taking advantage of these 
opportunities does however require 
strategic intent and substantial invest-
ment by local firms. The greater the leap 
required the more important is an effec-
tive local innovation system, which 
includes collective private initiatives and 
supportive public organisations.  
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